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The discipline of history can often misrepresent events, tell half-truths, or create myths that 
perpetuate false accounts. Unfortunately, if these deficient chronicles are retold enough times by 
enough credible historians they become the mainstream orthodox history. The field of Canadian 
Aboriginal history, in particular, has suffered greatly from this popular yet misleading kind of 
historiographical regurgitation, and the signing of Treaty Six at Fort Carlton, Saskatchewan in 
1876 is one such example. The standard Canadian myth regarding Treaty Six holds that the 
Plains Cree were facing cultural annihilation in the face of aggressive colonial expansion and 
because of this they had to sign Treaty Six with the Canadian state or perish by starvation.
1
 
Although there is some truth to this assertion as the buffalo herds, the main source of Cree food 
and livelihood, had greatly diminished and settlers were arriving in ever greater numbers, it does 
not tell the whole story.
2
 Specifically, by painting Cree people as passive non-actors who settled 
for government treaty terms, the myth misrepresents the Canadian government as farsighted and 
altruistic while simultaneously robbing Cree people of their agency.
3
 This lopsided 
historiographical interpretation is simply not true, as the Cree nation, led by Chiefs Mistawasis 
and Ahtahkakoop, did possess and employ agency while signing Treaty Six. Their exertion of 
agency can be seen most clearly in three ways. First, the transference of Rupert’s Land from the 
Hudson’s Bay Company to the Dominion of Canada incited political resistance in the North-
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West, which included Cree people. Second, Cree people had a long history of adaptation and 
survival in adversity upon which they drew in their negotiations with Canada. Third, Treaty Six 
saw the inclusion and expansion of many far-reaching terms beneficial to Cree and their 
descendants. By looking at these three factors together it is possible to construct a more complete 
historical interpretation of Treaty Six, one that dispels the Canadian myth that Mistawasis, 
Ahtahkakoop, and the Cree were passive co-operatives who accepted government-imposed treaty 
terms.  
Perhaps the best way to understand the agency that Chiefs Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop 
and the Cree Nation possessed and employed in 1876 during Treaty Six is to examine the 
political circumstances of the North-West after the transfer of Rupert’s Land to Canada in 1870. 
It is prudent to start here because it was the social upheaval that the land transaction caused that 
led the Cree to demand treaty. The Plains Cree prior to 1870 had always been an autonomous 
nation; they had their own system of governance and leadership and had engaged in international 
trade with the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) for over two hundred years.4 Cree scholar Neal 
McLeod explains the equal power dynamic that existed between the Cree and the HBC before 
Treaty Six: “Prior to the treat[y] there had been roughly 200 years of mutually beneficial 
trade...The notion of reciprocity (miyo-wicihitowin, ‘helping each other in a good way’) was the 
core of this relationship.”5 Moreover, according to McLeod, their long-term international 
relationship was based strictly on “economic gain.” At no time did the Cree relinquish their 
rights or sovereignty to the HBC.
6
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The unannounced transfer of Rupert’s Land, then, from HBC to Canada in 1870 came as 
a great shock for Cree peoples who had been neither informed of, nor consulted about, the deal.
7
 
Perplexed, the Cree steadfastly believed that they remained a free people: after all, their nation 
had not entered into land negotiations with the Queen to surrender their ancestral lands, and, 
even if they did, they simply would not give away the land that the Creator had given to them.
8
 
First Nations lawyer Sharon Venne explains the confusing political climate in Saskatchewan 
between the years 1870 and 1876: “The [Cree] peoples heard that the Hudson’s Bay Company 
had sold their lands to the British Crown. The Chiefs could not believe that the trading company 
could have acquired their lands. In present circumstances, it would be tantamount to Pepsi Cola 
or another such company gaining title to the lands of another country merely by engaging in 
trading. The [Cree] peoples never recognized that the company had any jurisdiction over them.”9 
Historian John Tobias supports Venne’s observation of the Cree’s outright rejection of the 
unconsulted land transfer (and the authority that came with it) by highlighting their initial 
reaction: “The Cree had learned in 1870 about Canada’s claim to their lands…[and] made clear 
that they would not allow settlement or use of their lands until Cree rights had been clearly 
recognized.”10 Tobias fortifies his point by illustrating exactly how the Cree mobilized against 
Canada’s sudden political imposition: “They interfered with geological surveys and prevented 
the construction of telegraph lines through their territory to emphasize that Canada had to deal 
with the Cree for Cree lands.”11 Also during this time, according to McLeod, the Cree began to 
forcefully exert their agency in the form of sporadic armed standoffs, and “in some cases 
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[resisted] the Crown by force.”12 Canada’s concern about the rise and spread of violence can be 
heard in a letter that Chief Factor of the Saskatchewan district W. J. Christie wrote to Governor 
Archibald in Fort Garry in 1871: “I have no doubt that they would have proceeded to [more] acts 
of violence, and once that had commenced, there would have been the beginning of the Indian 
war.”13   
Indeed, Christie’s fear was not unfounded. Venne identifies that systemic, all-out war 
was a real possibility in the North-West Prairies post transfer: “All over the West following 
1870…Indigenous peoples were protecting their territory without a treaty. If the Crown wanted 
to have access to their territories, the Crown would need an agreement from the Indigenous 
peoples.”14 We can thus see that a wave of Native resistance swept the west and, consequently, 
also closed it off to the young Canadian state. Tobias bluntly describes Canada’s lack of agency 
in the area during this time: “They [the government] had no plan on how to deal with the 
[western] Indians.”15 Historian Sarah Carter supports Tobias’ claim; however, she also believes 
that the organized Native resistance had delivered political control to Cree and other Indigenous 
peoples who then initiated Treaty Six (and the other numbered treaties) so they could positively 
affect their own lives: “[T]here was no [government] plan or particular direction; the pattern and 
timing of treaty-making…were to a great extent the result of pressure brought to bear by 
Aboriginal people…Aboriginal people were interested in entering into agreements that could 
assist them to acquire economic security in the face of a very uncertain future.”16 The testimony 
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of Alexander Morris, the lead Canadian official during Treaty Six, on day one of the negotiations 
corroborates Carter’s observation that the Cree had initiated the talks: “I am here now because 
for many days the Cree nation have been sending word that they wished to see a Queen’s 
messenger face to face.”17  
  In this reversal of power we see the neglected other half of the Canadian 
historiographical myth pertaining to western treaty making: Cree political agency. No longer are 
Mistawasis and the Cree simply starving and waiting for treaty terms to end their perpetual 
suffering. Instead, they become the main actors who force the Canadian government, by way of 
organized resistance, to recognize them as an independent nation through Treaty Six. Tobias 
pinpoints this fact of agency: “[The] Plains Cree in the period 1872-5 [had] compelled the 
government of Canada to [make treaty] with the Indians of the Qu’Appelle and Saskatchewan 
districts.”18 Historian D. J. Hall further argues that the Cree “not only forced [treaty]…[they] 
raised most of the issues!”19 Notwithstanding Cree agency, the underlying facts pertaining to the 
“old treaty myth” remain intact: the buffalo herds had diminished immensely, and settlers were 
pushing westward in ever-increasing numbers, and both factors greatly threatened Cree 
sovereignty.
20
   
Yet, when one considers both of these impingements one must also remember that the 
Cree nation had always been able to adapt to new circumstances and new ways of life.
21
 Their 
history of changing economic strategies in the fur trade and their inclusion of agricultural in 
Treaty Six is a testament to their agency. Tobias explains: 
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In adopting this position [agriculture via Treaty Six], the Cree were simply demonstrating a skill that they 
had shown since their initial contact with Europeans in 1670. On numerous occasions during the fur trade era, 
they had adapted to changed environmental and economic circumstances, beginning first as hunters, then 
provisioners and middlemen in the Hudson’s Bay Company trading system, and finally adapting from a 
woodland to parkland-prairie buffalo hunting culture to retain their independence.
22
 
 
Possibly the best example of Cree resiliency and adaptation is found in the western smallpox 
epidemics that occurred between 1780 and 1820 that had drastically winnowed all of the 
Indigenous nations of central Saskatchewan.
23
 The Cree and Assiniboine (the two most dominant 
nations in the area) lost roughly half to three quarters of their populations during this time.
24
 
Oddly, and unexplainably, beginning in 1781, the Cree population slowly started to rebound, 
then; surprisingly, after 1820, they rose to completely dominate central Saskatchewan.
25
 
Concurrently, the Assiniboine receded southward, reeling from the effects of repeated outbreaks, 
and never again to attain prominence in Saskatchewan.
26
 Fur trade historian Arthur Ray tries to 
make sense of the Cree’s strange biological ability to persevere and expand while the 
Assiniboine contracted: “The sharply different population-growth rates [post 1780-1820] of the 
Assiniboine and Western Cree are puzzling considering that the two groups were living in 
roughly similar environmental settings and were often in close contact with each other…[What is 
more,] it may be that the general mortality rates of the Cree were actually higher than those of 
the Assiniboine because of somewhat lower standards of living.”27 Blood Elder Dorothy First 
Rider is not confused; she offers a simple, unscientific explanation: “The Cree had a long history 
of survival [by] adaptation.”28  
                                                          
22
 Tobias, 522. 
23
 Arthur Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Roles as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of 
Hudson’s Bay, 1660-1870, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 111. 
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid.   
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Sarah Carter, Dorothy First Rider and Walter Hildebrant, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7: Treaty 
Elders and Tribal Council, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 220. 
7 
 
Certainly Chiefs Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop must have known in 1876, as Elder First 
Rider does now, of their own people’s ability to adapt and thrive in adversity. Based on this 
assumption of agency, it is conceivable that maybe this is the real reason why Mistawasis entered 
into Treaty Six instead of continuing the successful resistance effort or going to war. Moreover, 
maybe this is why Mistawasis had enough confidence to encourage his people to switch from 
mobile bison hunting to sedentary farming. Adapting their way of life to survive had, after all, 
been the Cree way of life for over two hundred years and it had always served them well. Why 
would Treaty Six, with its reserves and agriculture, be any different than past segues?
29
 Authors 
Walter Hildebrant, Carter, and First Rider support the observation that Mistawasis believed 
strongly in his people’s ability to adapt to agriculture by showing that farming/husbandry was 
their “top priority” during Treaty Six: “[T]he goal was…adapting to an agricultural way of life; 
this is what the Cree demanded. Cree leadership…[had] settled on the strategy of becoming 
agriculturalists [to survive].”30 So vehemently did the Cree and Mistawasis pursue the issue of 
farming during Treaty Six that on day four of the negotiations a frustrated Morris tried to resolve 
the topic by offering privileges he was not authorized to make: “Therefore, I would agree to give 
every spring, for three years, the sum of one thousand dollars to assist you in buying provisions 
while planting the ground. I do this because you seem very anxious to make a living for 
yourselves, it is more than has been anywhere else; I must do it on my own responsibility, and 
trust to the other Queen’s councillors to ratify it.”31 Concerned about their livelihood, Mistawasis 
and the Cree leadership secured a comprehensive agricultural plan from Morris and the 
Dominion of Canada, one which they knew they could execute given their long history of 
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adaptation.
32
 This willingness to adapt to a new way of life by way of Treaty Six helps uproot the 
old historiographical germ that the Cree had to adapt to a new way of life because of Treaty 
Six’s climate (e.g. starvation, settler encroachment, and government imposition). However 
enlightening this shift of perspective is in appreciating the Cree’s agency during 1876, it is not 
the clearest display of their wherewithal during treaty talks. Their agency is most brightly 
illuminated in what stipulations they managed to secure during negotiations. 
No doubt the strongest example of Cree agency during Treaty Six is found in the treaty 
terms themselves. To start, in August 1876 when Lieutenant-Governor Alexander Morris and his 
Commissioners came to Fort Carlton to negotiate land surrender from the Cree, they brought a 
pre-drafted contract that they were not legally authorized to alter.
33
 Métis interpreter Peter 
Eramsus reveals the limitations of Morris’s power: “His assumption had been [that] the Indians 
[would] completely adopt his treaty terms, which by his own words he was not authorized to 
change in any form. I thought to myself, ‘a boxer sent into the ring with his hands tied.’”34 
Regardless of this handcuffing, the original terms were changed through the impressive 
negotiation skills of Mistawasis, Ahtahkakoop, and their council.
35
 In a back-peddling official 
document sent to Ottawa in December 1876, Morris tried to explain the treaty’s alterations:  
The negotiations were difficult and protracted. The Hon. David Mills, then minister of the Interior, in his 
Annual report thus characterizes them: ‘In view of the temper of the Indians of the Saskatchewan 
[Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop], during the past year, and of the extravagant demands which they were 
induced to prefer on certain points, it needed all the temper, tact, judgement and discretion, of which the 
Commissioners were possessed, to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory issue.’36 
 
Even while hiding behind Mills’s defence it was obvious to officials in Ottawa that Morris did 
not follow orders, or “bring the negotiations to a satisfactory issue,” nor did he control the 
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talks.
37
 Tobias explains the political uproar in parliament that followed Morris’s weak treaty 
showing: “So successful were they [the Plains Cree] in negotiating…that when the Mackenzie 
government received a copy of Treaty 6 in 1876 it accepted the treaty only after expressing 
protest concerning the too-generous terms granted to the Cree.”38 Surely, the protest in Ottawa 
would have risen to an incomprehensible din if Morris had included in the final treaty draft all 
the promises that he had made under ceremonial oath, most of which have never been 
recognized.
39
 Notwithstanding Morris’s deception by omission, Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop 
did manage to ink many far-reaching terms not included in other treaties, and it is by these 
allotments that we can truly understand the skill and agency of these two diplomats.
40
 
 Of all the treaty terms that Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop secured in Treaty Six perhaps 
the most well-known and all-encompassing was the medicine chest.
41
 Morris’s words on day 
four of Treaty Six negotiations captures the moment when this famous treaty term was granted: 
“A medicine chest will be kept at the house of each Indian agent, in case of sickness amongst 
you.”42 Venne calls this provision in Treaty Six the legal basis for granting health care to modern 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada: “The Chiefs and Headmen successfully negotiated universal 
healthcare for all Indigenous peoples within Treaty 6. Treaty 6 is the only numbered treaty that 
includes a ‘medicine chest’ provision.”43 As well, historian J. R. Miller notes, powerful speeches 
delivered by Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop had compelled Morris to extend education privileges 
found in previous treaties.
44
 But Treaty Six was different than any other treaty because, as 
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underscored by Venne, it granted “universal access to education for all Indigenous peoples 
without discrimination by age or sex.”45 Again, this historic moment of Cree agency is 
galvanized in Morris’s words: “Your children will be taught, and then they will be as well able to 
take care of themselves as the whites around them.”46 Admittedly, feeding his people by 
agriculture had been Mistawasis’s and Ahtahkakoop’s most immediate concern during Treaty 
Six but it may be that universal health care and education were their wisest and most far-reaching 
inclusions. For in securing both of these stipulations the chiefs had ensured a future for not only 
their people but for all Aboriginal peoples in Canada.  
 Be that as it may, Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop had also obtained a vast number of other 
minor terms that collectively exhibited great agency, chief among these terms was securing water 
rights. According to Venne, water rights had been a major concern for Cree during the 
negotiations because “many of their communities within the Treaty Six area were located on or 
near a lake.”47 Venne also says that Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop “never gave up their rights to 
water, or the fish, animals, or other things that lived in the water…[because] they made a good 
living from trapping fish and animals that lived in the water.”48 It was only after the Cree were 
promised their water rights by Morris did they agree to finalize Treaty Six: “The water is not 
what she [The Queen] wants” he notes, “I do not want to interfere with your…fishing. I want 
you to pursue it…as you have heretofore done.”49 Moreover, Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop had 
also successfully negotiated the right to choose the reserve sites on which their people could 
live.
50
 The granting of this little known stipulation is captured in Morris’s words, recorded by 
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government translator and Secretary of the Commission Hon. A. G. Jackes: “You can have no 
difficulty in choosing your reserves; be sure to take a good place so that there will be no need to 
change; you would not be held to your choice until it was surveyed.”51 Venne strongly asserts 
that these reserve sites must not be understood as lands being given to the Cree as purported by 
the “altruistic government myth” because “these were not lands given to the Indigenous peoples 
by the Crown or government.”52 She drives her point home by asking: “How [could] the 
government or the Queen give them lands when all the lands belonged to them?”53 In reality, the 
Cree would have never signed Treaty Six if they had not been able to choose where they were to 
settle. Furthermore, Venne states that even the ground upon which the Cree and the immigrant 
settlers were to eventually occupy had never actually been sold by Mistawasis and Ahtahkakoop 
in Treaty Six: “[L]and and resources were never sold, but only loaned.”54 And even then, it was 
only “for the use of the land to the depth of the plough.”55 Again, the Cree would not have signed 
the treaty if they thought they were relinquishing their divine inheritance because they simply 
could not sell or trade it.
56
 Water rights, hand-picked reserves, and land possession had all stood 
intact as Cree rights at the conclusion of Treaty Six. Their later illegal violation by the Canadian 
government does not mar the contemporary agency that Mistawasis and the Cree exercised 
during Treaty Six. In fact, the list of successfully negotiated Treaty Six terms also includes many 
more things like; hunting and trapping rights, adequate and fair policing, mineral rights, social 
assistance, citizenship, farm instruction and machinery, vocational training and tools, treaty 
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money, animal protection, housing, and access to a community-chosen Indian Agent.
57
 When the 
full scope of successfully negotiated treaty terms is presented, it is easy to see just how much 
agency Mistawasis, Ahtahkakoop, and the Cree exerted during Treaty Six. 
In conclusion, the historiographical myth that portrays Mistawasis, Ahtahkakoop, and the 
Cree people during Treaty Six as passive non-actors while painting the Canadian government as 
generous and far-sighted is not accurate. A shift in historical perspective comes when one 
examines how the Cree deployed their agency in a threefold approach. Firstly, the transference of 
Rupert’s Land caused organized resistance in the North-West giving Cree people political 
agency. Secondly, the Cree people had a long history of adaptation and could use this to 
transition into agriculture. Lastly, Treaty Six saw the expansion and inclusion of many far-
reaching terms not included in previous Numbered Treaties. As a final thought, the historical 
documents I examined for this paper all sadly point to the undeniable fact that the Canadian 
government has acted criminally by not upholding their end of Treaty Six. And, despite 
Mistawasis’s and Ahtahkakoop’s skilled diplomacy in securing extensive treaty terms, the Cree 
did not thrive after 1876 because of Canada’s gross negligence. But, we must wait for that 
narrative to be told, because that is another story for another essay in another class. 
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